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24 - Sharing the burden of GHG reductions
- Edited by Joseph E. Aldy, Robert N. Stavins, Harvard University, Massachusetts
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- Book:
- Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 03 December 2009, pp 753-785
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Summary
Introduction
In response to the ever-clearer threat posed by climate change, the Group of Eight (G8) large industrialized countries have adopted a goal of reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 50 percent by 2050. Together with existing developed-country commitments and proposals, and equity principles written into various climate agreements, this target provides a starting point for consideration of a post-2012 international climate agreement. Success in upcoming negotiations should be aided by a clear-eyed view of the implications of simultaneously pursuing emissions targets and equity goals, and this analysis is intended as a contribution to this important international process.
While references to a 50 percent global GHG reduction target can be found in the statements of the major industrialized countries, it is clear that meeting this target will require the participation of countries beyond that small group. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its subsidiary agreements lay out broad terms of reference for sharing the task. For example, the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol divide the world into a set of developed countries (Annex I) and developing countries (non-Annex I) with “common but differential responsibilities.” The Bali Action Plan, in setting out guidelines for long-term cooperative action in the post-2012 period, reflects this equity principle and emphasizes the need for “positive incentives for developing country Parties for the enhanced implementation of national mitigation strategies and adaptation action.” Developed countries, in turn, have the responsibility to provide financial and other resources to “meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response measures” (UNFCCC, Article 4.8, italics added).
23 - How (and why) do climate policy costs differ among countries?
- from Part III - Mitigation of greenhouse gases
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- By Sergey Paltsev, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA, USA, John M. Reilly, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA, USA, Henry D. Jacoby, Massachusetts Institute of Technology CT, USA, Kok Hou Tay, Yale FES Cambridge, MA, USA
- Edited by Michael E. Schlesinger, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Haroon S. Kheshgi, Joel Smith, Francisco C. de la Chesnaye, John M. Reilly, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Tom Wilson, Charles Kolstad, University of California, Santa Barbara
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- Book:
- Human-Induced Climate Change
- Published online:
- 06 December 2010
- Print publication:
- 11 October 2007, pp 282-293
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Summary
Introduction
There have been many studies of the cost to Annex B countries of meeting Kyoto Protocol commitments. Unfortunately for these analyses, the Protocol has proved to be a moving target in terms of its interpretation and likely implementation. In addition, the economic performance and future expectations for some parties also are changing, and with these changes come revisions in reference emissions, which have a strong influence on the projected cost of meeting Protocol requirements. Looking back across these studies, the progression of work can be divided into three broad phases. The first studies were conducted soon after the Protocol was signed in 1997, and they focused on carbon emissions from fossil fuels. Often they assumed an idealized system of harmonized carbon taxes, or cap-and-trade among all the Annex B parties, contrasting such systems with implementation without international permit trade but with an idealized trading system operating within each country (see, for example, Weyant and Hill [1999]). These studies showed a high cost of the Protocol with autarkic compliance, but huge benefits of international trading because it made Russian “hot air” (potentially tradable emission quotas in excess of their anticipated emissions) accessible to other Annex B parties.
A second phase of studies followed the final negotiations in Marrakech in 2001 (Manne and Richels, 2001; Babiker et al., 2002; Bohringer, 2002). By that time, the United States had withdrawn from the Protocol, and the potential contribution of Article 3.4 carbon sinks had been defined for each party.
6 - A multitrack climate treaty system
- Edited by Joseph E. Aldy, Robert N. Stavins, Harvard University, Massachusetts
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- Book:
- Architectures for Agreement
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 10 September 2007, pp 237-279
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Summary
Introduction
The global regime for climate change consists of two agreements, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, neither of which adequately addresses the real challenge. Certainly, neither agreement has had much effect so far. Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide have increased every year since the UNFCCC was negotiated in 1992. The trend did not change after the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997. Although Kyoto is still some way from being implemented, its short comings are already apparent. A new approach is needed.
In this paper I sketch out an alternative treaty system – a new “architecture,” in the language of this book. Taking the objective to be sustainable development that reduces climate change risk, this new system consists of four parts: first, protocols that promote research and development (R & D) into new energy, air capture, and geoengineering technologies; second, protocols that encourage the development and diffusion of new mitigation technologies emerging from this R & D; third, cooperation in financing investments that will make the poorest countries less vulnerable to climate change (an example being investments that reduce malaria prevalence or that improve malaria treatment); and, fourth, agreements on the deployment of geoengineering technologies, particularly in response to the first warning signs of abrupt or catastrophic climate change.
This is a fundamentally different approach, and to understand the reason for it, it is best to begin by outlining the limitations of the current treaty arrangement.